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Katrina and the Philanthropic Landscape in New Orleans
Ludovico Feoli

This article explores the impact of Hurricane Katrina

on the philanthropic landscape in New
Orleans, drawing on the perspective of participants in the field—staff and board members of
community, local, and national foundations and key nonprofits—who were surveyed or
interviewed for this purpose. It does not offer a definitive statement about the disaster as it pertains
to philanthropy; nor does it consider the crucial leadership role of the many individuals involved
in the recovery process, even though that role often intercepted with the philanthropic sector.
Instead, it seeks to identify general trends that emerge from a qualitative assessment of the
collected data. Katrina was in many ways an unprecedented disaster: over a million people fled
Louisiana, more than two hundred thousand dwellings in New Orleans were destroyed, 80 percent
of the city was at some point under water, and two thousand lives were lost. Taking into account
the scope of the impact of Katrina and the role typically played by philanthropy in such
circumstances, this article inquires whether and how philanthropic activity was itself transformed
by the storm, as interpreted by philanthropic participants.
The narrative that emerges from the analysis is one of significant transformation.
Extraordinary circumstances called for extraordinary measures, and members of the philanthropic
community responded, deeply transforming the philanthropic landscape in the process. These
changes occurred at the local level but also percolated upward to national funders. The most salient
examples the participants cited are presented here and are followed by a brief discussion of
potentially missed opportunities and lessons learned.

The Philanthropic Field before Katrina
Before Katrina, the philanthropic field in New Orleans was significantly constrained. A very small
group of committed donors were asked to support everything. Yet, grantors were not coordinated
and, for the most part, not impact-driven. Much of the giving went to established institutions with
traditional missions or was otherwise diffused in small amounts to many organizations. Grant
making was not innovative or forward-thinking; it was mainly reactive. Partly because of this
limitation, and partly because of the deficiencies of local government, there was no single player
capable of bringing together the vision, resources, and leadership necessary to significantly impact
the central social and economic problems in the community. National funders were mostly
disengaged from the city, citing its lack of capacity and legendary levels of public-sector
corruption.
On the grantee side the field was fragmented, with many small organizations pursuing similar
objectives but not communicating, much less collaborating, among themselves, and with their
collective needs exceeding the existent giving capacity. The sector was disjointed. Critical areas
such as public education were inaccessible because of the absence of viable conduits through
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which funders could reach them. On one hand, while well-meaning, nonprofits often had low
capability levels in administrative, financial, and governance matters. On the other hand,
innovative but unproven start-ups, such as the Youth Empowerment Project in juvenile justice,
had limited access to funding.

A Changed Landscape
The plight generated by Katrina and the failure of the New Orleans levee system played out live
on a twenty-four-hour news cycle. This continuous reporting greatly increased the national
visibility of the city, casting it in an entirely new and terrible light. By showing the incongruity of
widespread poverty and exclusion in a major American city known and beloved by millions of
visitors, the reporting galvanized major national philanthropic actors into action. The city was
catapulted from having barely any interaction with external philanthropists to facing hundreds of
philanthropies wanting to play a role. New Orleans became a case for impactful interventions in
the areas of disaster recovery, rebuilding, urban renewal, education reform, and social services.
The response from national funders was enormous as they engaged immediately and flocked to
the city without prompting. So did thousands of volunteers who gave their time and labor for a
variety of purposes, from gutting and building houses to teaching. Donations from multiple other
sources also flowed to the state and led to the creation of the Louisiana Disaster Recovery
Foundation, which is today the Foundation for Louisiana.
This influx of funding, directed to both established organizations and startups, changed the
philanthropic landscape by increasing the number of nonprofits, encouraging competition and
innovation but also collaboration, and driving institutional reform. The haphazard and uneven
response by all levels of government—federal, state, and municipal—forced the nonprofit sector
to assume much of the immediate responsibility for rebuilding and human services. In 2015, ten
years after the storm, the Urban Institute reported that growth in the nonprofit sector in New
Orleans had far outpaced national growth, in terms of revenue and the number of organizations.1
In 2012, there were 950 registered nonprofits in New Orleans, not including religious
congregations and other groups that did not submit tax documents to the IRS. This figure was 40
percent higher than what it was in 2000.2
This growth led to increased competition for funding, which itself focused the efforts of
grantors and grantees on impact and outcomes. Many local foundations and individual donors
started to target their philanthropy to specific priorities, particularly in those areas of greater need
in the city, such as housing, public health, public education, and social and criminal justice. Baptist
Community Ministries, for example, turned to a renewed focus on invitation-only strategic grants.
United Way of Southeast Louisiana became a single-issue organization focused on poverty and its
root causes, the RosaMary Foundation decided that it would prioritize public charter schools and
related entities over private schools and related entities, and the Booth Bricker Fund went from
giving almost nothing to public education to making grants for nothing else. The Greater New
Orleans Foundation (GNOF) rebranded its grant-making program as the Impact Grants,
consolidating it into six key areas where it could channel larger grants.3 It also engaged in advocacy
to compound that impact, by developing the advocacy capacity of its grantees and exercising a
more active voice itself. This refocusing on impact was also translated to the fundraising side.
GNOF, for example, started emphasizing giving outcomes with donors rather than appealing to
charitable impulse.
The increased focus on key sectors accompanied by the flow of funding spurred innovation in
the nonprofit sector. This innovation took form in the emergence of new organizations but also in
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the provision of new services by existent organizations to confront the challenges created or
aggravated by the storm. Among many examples of the first type of innovation are the emergence
of new fundraising/grant-making organizations (Pro Bono Publico Foundation, Emerging
Philanthropists of New Orleans); new advocacy organizations to assign responsibility for the levee
failures (Levees.org), raise the salience of recovery issues (Women of the Storm), promote
institutional reforms (Citizens for 1 Greater New Orleans), and build cross-sectoral consensus for
reforms (Common Good); new organizations to provide funding, leadership, staff development,
and other assistance to public schools (New Schools for New Orleans, Orleans Public Education
Network); and new organizations to promote social innovation and entrepreneurship (Propeller,
Tulane). The willingness of funders to take risks in supporting these (and many other) start-ups
and in recognizing the need to endorse the changes they were advocating reflects the significant
transformation that was occurring in the philanthropic sector.
An example of the second type of innovation—new services provided by existent
organizations—is GNOF’s introduction of capacity building for nonprofits in what it called
Organizational Effectiveness, a program that leveraged national funding to help nonprofit
organizations adopt best practices and develop leadership, management, and governance skills.
The program enabled them to deal with the more stringent grant-making processes emerging in
the city, while boosting their strength and resilience. In the aggregate, this process increased the
effectiveness of the nonprofit sector and strengthened it as a whole. Other notable innovations at
GNOF were its adoption of the promotion of philanthropy as one of its missions and the
introduction of GiveNOLA Day. This initiative, a twenty-four-hour event focused on giving to
nonprofits, introduced philanthropy to thousands of individual donors, increasing the number of
people in the community who are involved with philanthropy. In its latest iteration (2019) more
than fifty thousand donors made contributions to 752 nonprofits, reaching almost six million
dollars in a single day. Paired with Organizational Effectiveness programs, GiveNOLA Day has
also contributed to the development of fund-raising capabilities in the nonprofit sector.
In this context, philanthropic entities started to collaborate, coordinating funding and other
efforts. For example, a small group of local funders, coordinated by GNOF, provided the original
funding that seeded New Schools for New Orleans and Common Good. At a larger scale, the
Community Revitalization Fund was a collaborative effort through which nine local foundations
combined resources with eleven national foundations after Katrina to create a $25 million housing
fund. The Greater New Orleans Funders Network emerged later to facilitate funder coordination
and collaboration toward the advancement of lasting and comprehensive change in equity and
justice goals. Its members are a collection of national and local foundations. More recently, but in
the same vein, the Mobilization Fund has combined resources from national and local funders to
promote the development of disadvantaged business enterprises through a network that also
incorporates business and local government agencies.
A greater emphasis on partnering and collaboration also emerged among nonprofits with
aligned missions. For example, the Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance organized after the
storm as a collaborative of nonprofit housing builders and community development corporations
advocating for the preservation and production of affordable housing. Under the auspices of
GNOF’s Organizational Effectiveness program and with the support of national funders,
Communities of Practice emerged as a mechanism to increase partnerships among organizations
and foster peer-to-peer learning in areas such as youth services, workforce development, and
advocacy and civic action for children. Also important was the adoption of a service-learning
requirement by Tulane University and its launching of the Center for Public Service. The Center
3

New England Journal of Public Policy
highlighted the relevance of nonprofits in the recovery process and the importance of creating
opportunities for engagement with the sector, placing it front and center in the minds and
experiences of students and academics, while also providing a conduit for their own civic
engagement.
This changed philanthropic landscape, where national funders had a stronger imprint, local
funders became more purposeful, innovation flourished, and collaboration improved, contributed
to the advancement of key institutional reforms in the city. Notable among them were the
establishment of an Ethics Review Board and the Office of Inspector General to increase
accountability and reduce waste and corruption in city government; the conversion and
consolidation of levee boards to focus them on their key purpose and reduce their use as sources
of patronage; the consolidation of city assessors into a single office to eliminate inconsistencies
and favoritism in property valuations; the overhaul of a failing K–12 public education system into
a charter system that, while controversial and still unproven, initiated a sustained trajectory of
positive change in test scores, graduation rates, and college attendance; and more recently, a
criminal justice reform to reduce incarceration rates. While many factors contributed to these
reforms and a complete causal explanation is beyond the scope of this article, the evidence
collected supports the counterfactual that they would not have occurred without the efforts of
nonprofits backed by the philanthropic sector.

National Funders: Promoting Change and Changing Themselves
As has been noted, Katrina changed the perspective of national funders toward New Orleans.
While they remained absent from the city before the storm, the opportunities Katrina created for
impactful intervention drove them to engage, directly and in collaboration with local partners,
often informed by local priorities, and sometimes not. Such engagement entailed innovation and,
consequently, risk taking, but it contributed to the many transformations in the philanthropic field
described earlier. National program officers brought best practices in addition to resources. They
shared their networks and knowledge. All these actions were immensely valuable and
transformational for local players. But the process also drove changes in the donors themselves
and, in some ways, contributed to changing the views of the larger philanthropic community. A
few examples may help illustrate these points.
Some of the country’s largest foundations, including Ford, Broad, Walton, Surdna, Kresge,
Kellogg, Rockefeller, and Bill and Melinda Gates, among many others, turned their attention to
New Orleans after Katrina. To deal with the unprecedented scope of the disaster and its impacts,
some of these foundations set aside their traditional policies and procedures. Their goal was to get
money into the streets as quickly as possible. Lacking prior institutional relationships, they were
at first limited to short-term disaster grant-making focused on food, shelter, clean-up, and initial
planning. As relationships with local entities gradually developed, the funding started to become
more programmatic and long-term, but the uniqueness of the circumstances still required
considerable creativity.
A well-known example was the Rockefeller Foundation’s partnership with GNOF and the
Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund to develop the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), an intense, fivemonth effort to create a citywide recovery plan that involved working with community
stakeholders. A previous recovery plan issued by a mayoral commission had been broadly decried
for proposing that certain sectors of the city remain as green spaces, essentially forfeiting their
rebuilding. This was a key moment in the storm’s aftermath. The ordinary citizens of New Orleans
whose lives were most affected by the storm asserted their right to have a voice in the recovery
4
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process that until then had been largely ignored by planners and philanthropists. In that context,
the UNOP venture took place amid widespread mistrust, and, because it included all stakeholders,
it had the potential of becoming mired in the decision-making process. But, despite the risks,
GNOF and Rockefeller moved forward and became key actors in the process, seeing it through to
completion. The UNOP provided a conduit for citizen engagement and eventually became a base
around which critical players and the city could align to direct the recovery process. The actions
of philanthropy, not government, placed the recovery back on track after it had been derailed.
Other innovations involved capacity building in the nonprofit and public sectors. The
Rockefeller Fellows program provided support to recruit and train mid-career development
professionals from around the country to be placed in organizations working for the rebuilding of
New Orleans. The Ford Foundation, in partnership with the Foundation for the Mid South,
developed a “loaned executive program” to expand the pool of skilled professionals in city
government. The Kellogg Foundation also worked to expand local capacity and leadership in
multiple areas, including race relations. The foundation made a commitment to help New Orleans
become a “child-focused” city, establishing a physical presence from which it continues to manage
close partnerships with GNOF and other local actors.
In time, national funders invested in public, private, and philanthropic partnerships aimed at
increasing the local community’s capacity to drive social change through direct action and
advocacy. These partnerships transformed the philanthropic field in New Orleans and established
a link to the broader philanthropic world that did not exist before Katrina. As a result, New Orleans
is now viewed as a source of innovation that is deserving of national resources and attention.
The changes in philanthropy promoted by Katrina also projected outwardly, to the national
and even global levels. For example, as a result of its engagement in the city, the Rockefeller
Foundation shifted its focus away from disaster management to resilience. It developed a program
to improve the resilience of cities around the world—100 Resilient Cities—of which New Orleans
was the first case. Another example is the Center for Disaster Philanthropy, which was created as
a direct response to the realization, after Katrina, that conventional ways of responding to disasters
are insufficient and unsustainable. It calls for a comprehensive approach to disaster-related
philanthropy, which involves support for recovery needs before and after disasters. The emphasis
is on the entire cycle of disasters and, as with Rockefeller, on building communities that are
resilient to disaster. Katrina therefore contributed to a deep change in the philanthropic approach
to disasters.
In a much broader sense, the exposure of incompetent public (FEMA) and private (Red Cross)
responses to the storm spurred a reorganization of those entities for greater effectiveness. It also
increased their accountability through public criticism and exposure by the press. The widespread
impacts of the storm served as an incentive for municipal and state governments to improve their
preparedness to deal with disasters. In short, New Orleans came to exemplify a modern disaster
situation in a crowded urban space where pockets of poverty and inequality create uneven
capacities to respond. It was a test case for what other cities would later experience (New York
under Super Storm Sandy, Houston under Hurricane Harvey), contributing to their preparedness.

Missed Opportunities
While national foundations were quick to respond to the storm, local actors had to invest
considerable efforts to convince them of the scope of the disaster. A large part of the early efforts
by GNOF leaders and others consisted of giving “disaster tours” to foundation and government
officials so they could internalize the extent of the devastation. The absence of a central focus point
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for the response meant that there was no shared vision to tackle the social and economic challenges
the city faced. Some of the philanthropic participants interviewed for this article believe that, as a
result, the sector was not bold enough in addressing the social and environmental injustices that
were uncovered by the storm, and that this was a missed opportunity. Efforts did eventually
coalesce around housing, schools, and employment, and considerable progress has been made in
all sectors. Yet, some argue that the vision, resources, and infrastructure necessary to make a more
significant mark on the region’s social and economic indicators are still not available today.
Many philanthropies also naively invested in new organizations that emerged after the storm
with good ideas but no experience or track record of success and that eventually failed to realize
their ambitious promises. While innovation and risk-taking, as described earlier, were necessary
and positive hallmarks of the sector’s response to the disaster, such experiences are a reminder that
they may be costly. Philanthropists should not be deterred from risk-taking as a result, but they
can learn from these experiences. While there are others, two highly publicized examples can be
cited here: the Pontchartrain Park Community Development project, and the Make It Right
Foundation project in the Lower Ninth Ward. Both projects were high-profile philanthropic efforts
boosted by celebrity power in key historic neighborhoods, so their failure had (and continues to
have) a significant psychological impact on the community as a whole.
The Pontchartrain Park Community Development project was an initiative to build 125
affordable, energy-efficient houses in the namesake flood-ravaged neighborhood, led by the actor
Wendell Pierce in partnership with the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority and an Ohio-based
development company. After several years of very slow advancement, the partnership frayed, the
Salvation Army and other supporters backed out of the project, and the Redevelopment Authority
sued to regain control of its properties. Additional lawsuits for breach of contract and overdue
loans followed from multiple parties, miring the project in legal troubles and leaving its goals
unfulfilled. The Make it Right Foundation project was launched by the actor Brad Pitt with the
goal of building 150 single-family, green, affordable houses in the Lower Ninth Ward, which had
also been devastated by Katrina levee breaches. While more than 100 of the houses were built,
complaints have emerged about collapsing structures, caving roofs, electrical fires, gas leaks, water
leaks, and black mold. Many of the units are now vacant and home owners have sued the Make It
Right Foundation, and the actor.
As was perhaps inevitable, some nonprofits that emerged during the heady early years of
abundant funding disappeared and along with them, some talent. While these losses likely reflect
a certain degree of healthy consolidation, some observe that smaller organizations have found it
difficult to survive in the competitive environment that has resulted. At the same time, some
redundancy persists, with different organizations seeking to provide the same services, and
collaboration among nonprofits remains challenging.
Another missed opportunity for local philanthropy may have been not thinking more
purposely about the long-term retention of external partners. While some prominent funders have
remained engaged and have developed collaborative mechanisms, such as the Greater New
Orleans Funders Network, many others have departed, and funding flows have waned. Though
some loss of funding was expected, local partners could have done better at pairing the duration
of funding to the time required for the complex social and economic transformations under way in
the city. As noted, many of the programs created in the aftermath of the storm were about getting
money out, not recapturing it. Local philanthropy did establish a link to philanthropy outside the
region and gained the respect and confidence of national funders. The question, as raised by one
of the participants interviewed for this article, is two-pronged: What can be done to increase the
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relevancy of national philanthropy in our region and ensure its continuing role in the city’s
recovery and transformation? And, who should lead in the development of this strategy and in
maintaining an ongoing engagement with national philanthropies? In the absence of Katrina,
compelling ideas must displace the storm as the key aggregating factor to garner interest from
funders. The region’s longstanding inequalities of class and race as well as the existential threats
it faces from subsidence, rising seas, and strengthening storms are obvious sources.

Parting Thoughts
New Orleans has a limited corporate presence, which is still struggling to replace the former
prominence of the oil and gas industries. The philanthropic sector will therefore continue to be
vital, and its effectiveness will hinge on its ability to partner with national funders. Philanthropic
participants in the city believe that the nonprofit sector is now stronger and more capable. They
also believe that the overall philanthropic community is larger and the donor profile in the city
more diverse than it was at any point in recent memory. At the same time, this philanthropic
community has gained greater awareness of the city’s problems and their potential solutions.
Katrina and its aftermath fostered a new openness among locals to how things are done elsewhere
and a desire to see New Orleans not just survive but thrive. The philanthropic community was
forced to reimagine how the city could be better. Answering that call contributed to the
development of a more sophisticated understanding of philanthropy.
The city has been transformed in many ways in the past fourteen years. It has become home
to an entirely new generation of strivers and entrepreneurs, and it is a source of new investments,
startups, and incubators. Bright young people have come to the city to volunteer or search for
opportunity. Public education and public housing have undergone profound changes. The city has
seen an increase in transparency and accountability in public administration accompanied by much
lower tolerance for patronage and corruption. Nonprofits and foundations have been an integral
part of these transformations. A strong sense exists that the recovery of New Orleans was led by
its citizens and backed by philanthropy.
It is too early to claim success for many of these reforms, which, to be sure, have critics. Yet
philanthropic participants believe that the best hope for solving the many challenges the city faces
rests with an enduring commitment from nonprofits and foundations to continue building a just
and resilient New Orleans.
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